Capital-Skill Complementarity: Does capital disaggregation matter? by Correa, Juan et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Capital-Skill Complementarity: Does
capital disaggregation matter?
Juan Correa and Miguel Lorca and Francisco Parro
Universidad Andres Bello, Universidad de Chile, Universidad Adolfo
Ibanez
March 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61285/
MPRA Paper No. 61285, posted 14. January 2015 07:50 UTC
Capital-Skill Complementarity:
Does capital disaggregation matter?∗
Juan A. Correa† Miguel Lorca‡ Francisco Parro§
Abstract
Using Chilean manufacturing plants data, we find: (1) the elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labor is lower than the elasticity of substitution between
capital and unskilled labor, and (2) the higher the technological component of the
capital stock the larger the size of complementarity between capital and skilled la-
bor. Our findings show that capital, as an aggregate input, may under(over) state
the complementarity between labor and the type of capital these workers actually
use.
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I. Introduction
Since Griliches (1969) first stated that capital is less substitutable for skilled labor than for
unskilled labor, several studies have attempted to test this hypothesis. Although some of
the literature on this topic supports the Griliches (1969) hypothesis, the evidence has been
almost exclusively concentrated in developed countries. Additionally, since most of the
related articles regard capital as an aggregate input and do not consider that there are also
differences in the complexity of capital, they may under(over)state the complementarity
between skilled labor and the type of capital that these workers actually use.
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This paper presents an input function model with skilled labor, unskilled labor, tech-
nological capital, and non-technological capital as production factors. Using panel data
from Chilean manufacturing plants, we disaggregate the stock of capital, defining three
different specifications for the technological stock of capital. We find that the elasticity
of substitution between capital and skilled labor is lower than the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and unskilled labor, supporting the Griliches (1969) hypothesis in a
developing country.
We also find that the higher the technological component of the capital stock the larger
the size of complementarity between capital and skilled labor. Our result suggests that
as the composition of the stock of capital moves toward more technological capital, the
expected rise in the skill premium might be higher. This issue has generally been over-
looked by the existing literature. However, our finding is important since this literature
may understate the impact of capital-skill complementarity on the skill premium in coun-
tries where the accumulation of technological capital is increasing rapidly. Indeed, Bruno
et al. (2009) show that developing countries accumulate physical capital first and then
they begin to import technological capital in a second stage of development.
Additionally, in most of our specifications, the elasticity of substitution between non-
technological capital and skilled labor is larger than the elasticity of substitution between
technological capital and unskilled labor; e.g., a machine can more easily substitute for
skilled workers than can software for unskilled workers. We denote this result as the
compensation effect, since it abates the unskilled labor demand decrease produced by the
capital accumulation when capital-skill complementarity holds.
Although it is more intuitive to expect that software is more substitutable for unskilled
workers than a machine is for skilled workers, our result can be explained by the idea that
the productivity gap between skilled and unskilled workers using non-technological capital
might not be large. For instance, skilled workers are not much more productive than
unskilled workers when driving trucks or operating a machine that performs routine tasks.
Therefore, the elasticity of substitution between non-technological capital and skilled labor
is smaller but close to the elasticity of substitution between non-technological capital and
unskilled labor. This phenomenon, combined with the fact that non-technological capital
substitutes for more workers than technological capital does (since machines can usually
replace a large number of unskilled workers in some industrial processes), explains why
the compensation effect is observed in the data. This effect is stronger when we consider
more high-tech definitions of technological capital. The reason behind this result is that
the elasticity of substitution between technological capital and unskilled labor strongly
decreases as soon as technological capital becomes more high-tech.
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A. Related literature
Capital-skill complementarity has been extensively analyzed for developed countries.1
Nevertheless, there have been very few attempts, such as Yasar and Paul (2008) and
Akay and Yuksel (2009), to verify whether the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis
holds for developing countries.
Krusell et al. (2000) find that the elasticity of substitution between capital equipment
and unskilled labor is higher than the elasticity of substitution between capital equipment
and skilled labor. Using U.S. time series between 1963 and 1992,2 they find positive elas-
ticity of substitution between capital equipment and labor for both skilled and unskilled
labor; however, the estimated elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled la-
bor is around 2.5 times that of capital and skilled labor. These results, though, have
been criticized by Polgreen and Silos (2008), who state that the elasticity of substitution
between capital equipment and unskilled labor is understated, as Krusell et al. (2000) use
a capital growth that “implies very rapid growth in the stock of capital equipment.”
Using a panel of countries, Duffy et al. (2004) find weak evidence of capital-skill com-
plementarity. In some of their specifications, they even find the surprising result that the
hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity is more sustainable with lower thresholds for
the definition of skilled labor.3
Papageorgiou and Chmelarova (2005) find no evidence of capital-skill complementarity
in OECD countries. They state that capital-skill complementarity is relatively more
pronounced in countries with an initial medium income and a low literacy rate. They use
school attainment to construct the skilled and unskilled labor variables.
Bartel et al. (2007) posit that IT machines require operators with engineering, pro-
gramming, and problem-solving skills. Therefore, technological capital is related more to
specific skills than to school attainment. This point is consistent with Krueger (1993) and
Autor et al. (2006), who find that computerization has increased the wages of workers
who perform non-routine tasks relative to the wages of workers whose jobs involve routine
tasks.4
Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that capital-skill complementarity may hold for some
industries but not for others. Bergstrom and Panas (1992), using a panel of Swedish
manufacturing industries, find that capital-skill complementarity holds most of the time.
1See, for instance, Bergstrom and Panas (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000).
2Krusell et al. (2000) construct the stock of capital using Gordon (1990) data.
3Duffy et al. (2004) work with five thresholds to define skilled labor: (1) “workers who have attained
some postsecondary education,” (2) “workers who have completed secondary education,” (3) “workers
who have attained some secondary education,” (4) “workers who have completed primary education,”
and (5) “workers who have attained some primary education.”
4Krueger (1993) finds that workers who use computers earn 10% to 15% higher wages than those who
do not use computers.
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However, the size of capital-skill complementarity that they find is different across indus-
tries.
Data sets from undeveloped economies lack of information on disaggregated measures
of capital; e.g., software and computers. Akay and Yuksel (2009), for instance, define
machines, tools, and other equipment as capital stock. Using panel data from Ghanaian
manufacturing firms, they find that the elasticity of substitution between capital and
unskilled labor is slightly higher than the elasticity of substitution between capital and
skilled labor. This evidence of capital-skill complementarity in Ghana is weaker than that
found by Krusell et al. (2000).
If we take into account non-technological capital only, our findings show a similar result
to that found by Akay and Yuksel (2009).5 However, when we consider technological
capital, our results suggest strong evidence of capital-skill complementarity, supporting
the idea that the composition of capital matters. We even find that technological capital
and skilled labor are complements in some specifications.
The existence of capital-skill complementarity has also been studied in international
trade literature. Traditional trade theories predict that as economies open to interna-
tional trade, developed countries will specialize in the production of goods that are inten-
sive in skilled labor, while developing countries will produce goods that are intensive in
unskilled labor. This prediction implies that the relative wage of skilled workers should
increase in developed countries but decrease in developing countries as economies open to
international trade.
However, the opposite phenomenon is observed in the data. As documented by Parro
(forthcoming), the skill premium has increased in several developing countries. Gallego
(2011) shows that the rise in the skill premium has also been present in the Chilean labor
market. The latter contradicts the main prediction of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model
of trade. Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile the observed rise in the skill premium with
the trade liberalization that most developing countries have experienced during recent
decades.
Nevertheless, when capital-skill complementarity exists, there is an additional force
balancing the effect of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Trade openness may stimulate
investment in a developing country that opens its economy, since an important portion of
equipment in that country must be imported rather than be produced by the country’s
own technology (e.g., computers). Therefore, if the capital-skill complementarity hypoth-
esis holds, trade openness may increase the relative demand for more educated workers
and push the skill premium up in those economies. For instance, Parro (forthcoming)
shows evidence that the introduction of trade in capital goods, together with capital-skill
complementarity, generates a skill-biased trade effect and thus allows the possibility of an
5Akay and Yuksel (2009) find the ratio of the substitution elasticity of capital and unskilled labor to
that of capital and skilled labor to be 1.1, while Krusell et al. (2000) find this ratio to be 2.5. In our
results, the ratio is 1.1.
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important positive effect on the skill premium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II. presents the econometric model
and the construction of the elasticities of substitution. Section III. describes the data that
we are working with. Section IV. shows our results and a check of robustness supporting
the evidence of capital-skill complementarity and the compensation effect in most of our
specifications. Section V. concludes.
II. Econometric Model
A. Translog input function
In order to answer our main question, we have to estimate the elasticities of substitution
between the different labor and capital categories.
We first define a constant returns to scale and Hicks-neutral input function F (L, S, T,K),
where L denotes the working hours of unskilled workers, S the working hours of skilled
workers, T technological capital, and K non-technological capital. Following Berndt and
Christensen (1973) and Berndt and Christensen (1974), we assume that we can charac-
terize the input function in a translog form as
lnF = β0 + βL lnL+ βS lnS + βT lnT + βK lnK +
1
2
γLL(lnL)
2 + γLS lnL lnS
+γLT lnL lnT + γLK lnL lnK +
1
2
γSS(lnS)
2 + γST lnS lnT + γSK lnS lnK
+
1
2
γTT (lnT )
2 + γTK lnT lnK +
1
2
γKK(lnK)
2.
We also assume that markets are competitive; thus, ∂F
∂L
= PL,
∂F
∂S
= PS,
∂F
∂T
= PT , and
∂F
∂K
= PK , where Pi denotes the price of input i relative to the price of the aggregate input
function F . Knowing that ∂ lnF
∂ ln i
= Pii
F
, the cost share of input i (si), we have
sL = βL + γLL lnL+ γLS lnS + γLT lnT + γLK lnK,
sS = βS + γLS lnL+ γSS lnS + γST lnT + γSK lnK,
sT = βT + γLT lnL+ γST lnS + γTT lnT + γTK lnK,
sK = βK + γLK lnL+ γSK lnS + γTK lnT + γKK lnK.
Since the cost shares must sum up to 1, we assume the additional restrictions that
γij = γji and
∑
j γij = 0, with j ∈ {L, S, T,K}. Imposing these restrictions, dividing the
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inputs by K, and therefore dropping the last row and column of the system, we have the
factor shares used in the estimation given by
sL = βL + γLL ln
L
K
+ γLS ln
S
K
+ γLT ln
T
K
,
sS = βS + γLS ln
L
K
+ γSS ln
S
K
+ γST ln
T
K
, (1)
sT = βT + γLT ln
L
K
+ γST ln
S
K
+ γTT ln
T
K
.
We can now solve this system by Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS),6 defining
y
′
i =
[
sL sS sT
]
,
β
′
=
[
βL γLL γLS γLT βS γSS γST βT γTT
]
,
and
Xi =

1 ln L
K
ln S
K
ln T
K
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ln L
K
0 1 ln S
K
ln T
K
0 0
0 0 0 ln L
K
0 0 ln S
K
1 ln T
K
 .
We can estimate βˆ as
βˆ = (X
′
(Ω⊗ IN)−1X)−1X ′(Ω⊗ IN)−1y, (2)
with Ω as the variance-covariance matrix and IN an identity matrix of size N .
B. Elasticities of substitution
Once we have βˆ, we can estimate input shares sˆi and compute elasticities of substitution
using Allen-Uzawa elasticities defined as
σˆij =
γˆij + sˆisˆj
sˆisˆj
, (3)
σˆii =
γˆii + sˆi
2 − sˆi
sˆi
2 .
6Any deviation of the cost shares from the logarithmic marginal products is assumed to be the result
of errors in optimizing behavior. Therefore, we specify a classical additive disturbance for each of the
equations in (1).
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We then use σˆij to test whether capital-skill complementarity holds. We define relative
capital-skill complementarity as σˆzL > σˆzS and absolute capital-skill complementarity as
σˆzL > 0 > σˆzS, ∀z ∈ {T,K}.
When disaggregating capital, we can also check the order of the elasticity of substitution
between non-technological capital and skilled labor (σˆKS), and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between technological capital and unskilled labor (σˆTL). If σˆKS > σˆTL (σˆKS < σˆTL),
we can argue that a machine is more (or less) substitutable for skilled workers than soft-
ware is for unskilled workers. We denote this as the compensation (or augmenting) effect.
Whenever capital-skill complementarity holds, there are two cases of analysis to check
whether we have the compensation effect (σˆKS > σˆTL) or the augmenting effect (σˆKS <
σˆTL). The first case assumes that σˆTS > σˆKL; i.e., the elasticity of substitution be-
tween technological capital and skilled labor is larger than the elasticity of substitution
between non-technological capital and unskilled labor. Figure 1 shows the relative order
of the elasticities of substitution, where the value increases toward the right-hand side.
Although we cannot compare σˆKS with σˆTL directly, capital-skill complementarity im-
plies that σˆTL > σˆTS and σˆKL > σˆKS. Therefore, σˆTL is unambiguously larger than σˆKS
(augmenting effect).
However, if we assume the second case, that σˆTS < σˆKL, both effects are possible, as
we can see in figure 2. By capital-skill complementarity, we know that σˆKL > σˆKS and
σˆTL > σˆTS; thus, the order between σˆTL and σˆKS is ambiguous. In this case, whether we
have the compensation effect or the augmenting effect depends on the distance of σˆKL to
σˆKS and to σˆTL.
Since σˆTS > σˆKL means that software is more substitutable for skilled workers than
machines are for unskilled workers (a case very unlikely to occur), without loss of gener-
ality, our analysis focuses on the assumption that σˆTS < σˆKL. Figure 3 shows isoquants
of the four different input relations that we are interested in. Vertical axes denote the
type of capital, while horizontal axes denote the type of labor. By capital-skill comple-
mentarity, we know that σˆKL > σˆKS and σˆTL > σˆTS. The latter is the reason why the
isoquant in subfigure 3b (subfigure 3d) is more L-shaped than the isoquant in subfigure 3a
(subfigure 3c). From σˆTS < σˆKL, we also know that the isoquant in subfigure 3d is more
L-shaped than the isoquant in subfigure 3a. What we do not know is whether the isoquant
in subfigure 3b is more or less L-shaped than the isoquant in subfigure 3c.
Whenever the isoquant shape in subfigure 3a is more (less) similar to the isoquant
shape in subfigure 3b than to that in subfigure 3c; i.e., σˆKL > σˆKS > σˆTL (σˆKL > σˆTL >
σˆKS), the compensation effect (augmenting effect) holds. We can carry out the equivalent
exercise stating that whenever the isoquant shape in subfigure 3d is more (less) similar
to the isoquant shape in subfigure 3c than to that in subfigure 3b; i.e., σˆTS < σˆTL < σˆKS
(σˆTS < σˆKS < σˆTL), the compensation effect (augmenting effect) holds.
Therefore, figure 3 indicates that the compensation effect (augmenting effect) holds
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whenever horizontal differences are smaller (larger) than vertical differences. The intuition
behind this can be seen as a combination of two factors: the user-friendliness of the type
of capital, which determines the level of capital-skill complementarity, and the size of the
labor substitution generated by the type of capital.
It is reasonable to assume that a user-friendly machine would be used by a lower ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers than a very complex machine. Therefore, the more user-
friendly the capital input, the smaller the degree of capital-skill complementarity. If a
process uses user-friendly machines, but these machines can perform tasks that would
otherwise be performed by a large number of workers, we expect the compensation effect
to hold. On the contrary, if machines are complex to use and do not substitute for too
many workers, the augmenting effect is more likely to hold.
III. Data and Variables
To perform the empirical analysis, we use the Annual Chilean Survey of Manufacturers
(ENIA) panel data from 2000 to 2011. Conducted by the Chilean Institute of Statistics,
the ENIA is an annual census of manufacturing plants with 10 or more employees. ENIA
data have been used in many relevant studies, such as Tybout et al. (1991), Liu (1993),
Levinsohn (1999), Pavcnik (2002), and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), among others.
The ENIA 2000-2011 provides us with a representative database of the Chilean man-
ufacturing sector. We focus our analysis on the plants that are linked to a particular
industry.7 Thus, we include plants operating in 52 industries identified by the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) at the three-digit level.8
The data retrieved from the ENIA 2000-2011 include gross fixed assets, depreciation
of gross fixed assets, investment in fixed assets, labor hours, number of workers, labor
compensation, value added, financial cost, corporate taxes, exports, IT expenditure, in-
termediate expenditure, ownership, location, and ISIC code.
The ENIA 2000-2010 provides the previous year’s value and the current year’s invest-
ment in eight types of fixed assets: land, buildings, machinery and equipment, furniture
and fixtures, vehicles, software, other tangible fixed assets, and other intangible assets.9
Using the perpetual inventory method, we can therefore compute the capital stock for
each type of asset as
kit = (1− δk)kit−1 + Iit,
7We do not include plants without an ISIC industry classification or plants with negative values of
T and/or K, which occurs when plants sell their fixed assets (negative investment) and the last-period
capital stock discounted by depreciation is not large enough to compensate for the negative investment.
8Table 1 shows the industries of our data, at the ISIC-2 level. We use the classifications provided by
the third revision of the ISIC.
9“Other tangible fixed assets” include tools and IT equipment, while “other intangible assets” include
patents, trademarks, goodwill, and water use permits.
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where kit is the type of fixed asset for plant i at time t, δk denotes the depreciation rate
of fixed asset k,10 and I is the investment in fixed asset k.11
We calculate the aggregate rental cost of capital r as
r =
B + δ
1− τ ,
with B as the discount rate and τ the effective corporate tax rate.12
In order to define both technological capital T and non-technological capital K, we
build three different specifications. In Specification 1, we define T as software and K as
the rest of fixed assets. In Specification 2, we define T as software plus intangible assets.
Finally, in Specification 3, we define T as the sum of software, other intangible assets,
machinery and equipment, and other tangible fixed assets.
The ENIA contains detailed information on both labor hours and labor compensation
for non-specialized personnel, maintenance workers, clerks, personal service workers, spe-
cialized workers, administrative personnel, and managers. We define specialized workers,
administrative personnel, and managers as skilled workers S, and the rest of the cate-
gories as unskilled workers L. As a crude robustness check of our definition of skilled
and unskilled workers, we computed the average percentage of skilled hours over the total
hours in the data set. Around 23% of the total hours corresponds to skilled labor. This
number is roughly close to the fraction of workers who complete a college education in
Chile.
IV. Empirical Results
We now estimate the model developed in section II. Our procedure consists first of an
OLS estimation of the system equation (1) to obtain each sˆi and their respective resid-
uals. We then construct the variance-covariance matrix Ω of the residuals and take the
Kronecker product of Ω and an identity matrix. After that, we compute βˆ, determined by
equation (2). We then use βˆ to estimate sˆi and insert them in equation (3) to obtain the
Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution σˆij. Finally, we compute 95% confidence intervals
10We use a depreciation rate of 2.5%, 13%, 25%, 13%, and 31.5% for buildings, machinery and equip-
ment, vehicles, intangible assets, and software, respectively, as documented by Oulton and Srinivasan
(2003). We use a depreciation rate of 18% for other tangible fixed assets, as reported by the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
11Investment is defined as the purchase of new and used assets plus asset improvements minus the sales
of used assets.
12The depreciation rate δ used in this formula is the weighted average of the fixed assets’ depreciation
rates. We follow Cerda and Saravia (2009) to compute the discount rate B and the effective corporate
tax rate τ , where B is the weighted average of the ratio of financial cost to value added and τ is the
weighted average of the ratio of effective tax paid to value added.
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for σˆij using the bootstrap method.
13 All tables include results from both pooled and
fixed effects regressions.
We first test capital-skill complementarity considering the aggregate level of capital; i.e.,
without distinguishing between technological and non-technological capital. Defining Z =
T +K, as we can see in Table 3, the elasticity of substitution between aggregate capital
and skilled labor (σˆZS) is lower than the elasticity of substitution between aggregate
capital and unskilled labor (σˆZL), denoting relative capital-skill complementarity.
14 This
result constitutes novel empirical evidence of capital-skill complementarity for a develping
economy. As discussed in section I., this result is important since it allows to reconciliate
the observed rise in the skill premium with the trade liberalization that most developing
countries have experienced in recent decades.
We now compare the aggregate and disaggregate elasticities of substitution, using the
four specifications described in section III.. Table 5 shows the elasticities of substitution
for the disaggregate specifications.15 We can see that there is both technological and
non-technological capital-skill complementarity for all specifications. However, as soon
as we use more disaggregate definitions of technological capital, the size of technological
capital-skill complementarity (defined as |σˆTL − σˆTS|) increases, while the size of non-
technological capital-skill complementarity remains roughly the same. We can even see
that there is absolute technological capital-skill complementarity in Specifications 1 and
2 for the pooled regressions, whereas technological and non-technological capital-skill
complementarity are very similar in Specification 3.
Another interesting result, which can be analyzed from Table 5, is that the compen-
sation effect holds in all specifications (σˆKS > σˆTL). We can also see that as soon as
we consider a more aggregate definition of technological capital, the compensation effect
decreases. As both σˆKL and σˆKS remain roughly similar in the three specifications, what
drives this result is that as soon as we consider more aggregate definitions for technolog-
ical capital, σˆTS increases faster than σˆTL does. Therefore, the elasticity of substitution
between technological capital and skilled labor is relatively more sensitive to the techno-
logical level of capital.
V. Conclusion
Using data from Chilean manufacturing plants, we find that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labor is lower than the elasticity of substitution between
capital and unskilled labor, supporting the Griliches (1969) capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis in a developing country.
13We perform the nonparametric bootstrap method (resampling with replacement) with 1,000 replica-
tions.
14Table 2 shows the coefficients of equation (1) for the aggregate specification.
15Table 4 shows the coefficients of equation (1) for the disaggregate specifications.
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Additionally, we find that the technological capital-skill complementarity is significantly
larger than the non-technological capital-skill complementarity, for different specifications
of technological capital. That is, the higher the technological component of the capital
stock the larger the size of complementarity between capital and skilled labor. Our
results show that related articles regarding capital as an aggregate input, and disregarding
that there are also differences in the complexity of capital, may under(over)state the
complementarity between skilled labor and the type of capital that these workers actually
use.
Another interesting result from our estimations is that the elasticity of substitution
between non-technological capital and skilled labor is larger than the elasticity of sub-
stitution between technological capital and unskilled labor. We call this phenomenon a
compensation effect, since it compensates for the decrease in the unskilled labor demand
when capital-skill complementarity holds. This finding may sound counterintuitive, as
it suggests, for example, that software is less substitutable for unskilled workers than
are machines for skilled workers. However, we show that the compensation effect may
occur when the productivity of skilled workers using non-technological capital is higher
but close to the productivity of unskilled workers using that kind of capital. This is in-
deed the intuitive case. For instance, the productivity gap between skilled and unskilled
workers driving a car or operating machines that perform routine tasks should be rela-
tively small. If this is accompanied by the fact that non-technological capital substitutes
for many more unskilled workers than technological capital does for skilled workers, the
compensation effect is likely to hold. We find that the compensation effect is stronger
when the technology level of the capital stock increases. This phenomenon occurs because
the elasticity of substitution between technological capital and unskilled labor strongly
decreases as soon as technological machines become more high-tech.
An interesting extension of this paper is to find the mechanism of how imports affect
the skill premium. Since the composition of capital matters, an increase in technological
capital imports, ceteris paribus, may raise the relative demand of skilled workers. This
issue has been overlooked by the literature so far and it may help us understand not only
the evolution of the skill premium over time but also cross-sectional variations of the skill
premium at some moment in time.
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(c) Technological capital and unskilled labor (d) Technological capital and skilled labor
Figure 3: Capital and labor isoquants
15
Table 1: R&D Groups of Industries by ISIC Number
High
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 - 351 Manufacture of other transport equipment except building and repairing of
ships and boats
Medium
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
27 Manufacture of basic metals
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats
Low
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
16 Manufacture of tobacco products
17 Manufacture of textiles
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery,
harness and footwear
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
16
Table 2: Coefficients of Equation (1) for the Aggregate Specification
Pooled Fixed effects
Variables sL sS sL sS
Ln(L/Z) 0.0665 -0.0395 0.0493 -0.0373
(0.000346)∗∗∗ (0.000257)∗∗∗ (0.000329)∗∗∗ (0.000267)∗∗∗
Ln(S/Z) -0.0395 0.0616 -0.0373 0.0470
(0.000257)∗∗∗ (0.000299)∗∗∗ (0.000267)∗∗∗ (0.000295)∗∗∗
β 0.4630 0.3840 -0.0042 -0.0092
(0.00269)∗∗∗ (0.00249)∗∗∗ (0.00156)∗∗∗ (0.00149)∗∗∗
Observations 33,003 33,003 33,003 33,003
R-squared 0.540 0.567 0.433 0.446
Standard errors in parentheses. ()∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level.
Table 3: Elasticities of Substitution for the Aggregate Specification
Elasticity Pooled Fixed effects
σˆZL 0.7578 0.8919
[0.7501 0.7648] [0.8855 0.8988]
σˆZS 0.6646 0.8530
[0.6552 0.6733] [0.8422 0.8636]
σˆLS 0.7142 0.7305
[0.7101 0.7183] [0.7237 0.7367]
σˆZZ -2.4185 -2.9342
[-2.4553 -2.3826] [-2.9753 -2.8938]
σˆLL -0.7827 -0.8561
[-0.7939 -0.7720] [-0.8681 -0.8454]
σˆSS -1.7433 -1.9225
[-1.7687 -1.7173] [-1.9485 -1.8931]
σˆZL/σˆZS 1.1402 1.0456
95% bootstrap confidence intervals in square brackets.
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